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IS SAY ON PAY ALL ABOUT PAY?
THE IMPACT OF FIRM PERFORMANCE
JILL FISCH*
DARIUS PALIA**
STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON***
The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 mandated a number of regulatory reforms
including a requirement that large U.S. public issuers provide their sharehold-
ers with the opportunity to cast a non-binding vote on executive compensation.
The “say on pay” vote was designed to rein in excessive levels of executive
compensation and to encourage boards to adopt compensation structures that
tie executive pay more closely to performance. Although the literature is mixed,
many studies question whether the statute has had the desired effect. Sharehold-
ers at most issuers overwhelmingly approve the compensation packages, and
pay levels continue to be high.
Although a lack of shareholder support for executive compensation is rela-
tively rare, say on pay votes at a number of issuers have reflected low levels of
shareholder support. A critical question is what factors drive a low say on pay
vote. In other words, is say on pay only about pay?
In this Article, we examine that question by looking at the effect of three
factors on voting outcomes—pay level, sensitivity of pay relative to economic
performance, and economic performance. Our key finding is the importance of
economic performance to say on pay outcomes. Although pay-related variables
affect the shareholder vote, even after we control for those variables, an issuer’s
economic performance has a substantial effect. Perhaps most significantly—
shareholders do not appear to care about executive compensation unless an is-
suer is performing badly. In other words, the say on pay vote is, to a large
extent, say on performance.
This finding has important implications. First, it raises questions about the
federally-mandated shareholder voting right as a tool for concerns about execu-
tive compensation. Say on pay has limited effectiveness if it is only being used to
discipline issuers that are underperforming, or if it is not being used as a vote on
outsize or inordinate pay as it was intended to be. Second, to the extent that the
shareholder vote influences board behavior, granting shareholders another fo-
rum for signaling their dissatisfaction with a firm’s economic performance may
be counterproductive. If shareholders are communicating concerns over near-
term stock performance through their say on pay votes, they may be increasing
director incentives to focus on short-term stock performance rather than long-
term firm value.
INTRODUCTION
One of the components of the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank)
was to require publicly-traded U.S. issuers to provide their shareholders with
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a non-binding vote on executive compensation—a “say on pay.”1 The ratio-
nale for say on pay was that shareholder oversight would both reduce overall
pay levels and encourage boards to tie executive pay more closely to firm
performance.2 In other words, say on pay would increase director
accountability.
Issuers have now experienced five years of say on pay votes, and the
effect of the provision remains heavily debated.3 Although shareholders at a
few issuers have rejected compensation plans, shareholders at the over-
whelming majority of issuers vote to approve executive compensation, and
the average percentage of votes in favor exceeds 90%.4 The link between say
on pay and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation is unclear—CEO
pay continued to rise for the first several years after Dodd-Frank, declined in
2015, and rose to record levels in 2016.5
Despite the continued strong support for executive pay packages, some
issuers have experienced low levels of support. Academic studies have
reached inconsistent results about the effect of low say on pay votes but have
generally failed to find conclusive evidence that issuers reduce executive
pay packages in response to lower approval rates.6 Studies suggest, however,
that issuers modified the structure of executive pay packages in response to
the say on pay mandate.7 In particular, current packages concentrate a
greater component of pay in restricted stock and stock options.8 It is not
clear, however, that this higher concentration of equity-based pay truly
1 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 951, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1).
2 See, e.g., John Carney, Why ‘Say on Pay’ Failed and Why That’s a Good Thing, CNBC
.COM (July 3, 2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100860959 (“From its very beginning, the ‘say
on pay’ movement was an attempt to reduce executive pay.”).
3 See, e.g., Jesse Eisinger, In Shareholder Say-on-Pay Votes, More Whispers Than Shouts,
DEALBOOK, June 26, 2013, https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/in-shareholder-say-on-
pay-votes-more-whispers-than-shouts/ (concluding that “[t]he ‘say on pay’ experiment is a
bust”).
4 A recent Semler Brossy report indicates that in 2016 the average vote result was 91% in
favor. Semler Brossy, 2016 Say on Pay Results: End of Year Report, at 2, (Feb. 1, 2017), http://
www.semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/uploads/SBCG-2016-Year-End-Say-on-Pay-Report-02-
01-2017.pdf.
5 See Theo Francis & Joanna S. Lublin, It’s Good to Be a CEO, Again: Stocks Rise, and So
Does Pay, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 20, 2017, 10:05 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/its-good-to-
be-a-ceo-again-stocks-rise-and-so-does-pay-1489937848?mod=djemalertNEWS (describing
median CEO pay for 2016 as “on track to set a post[-]recession record” and terming “the
2015 slowdown in chief executive pay [as] temporary”).
6 See, e.g., Christopher S. Armstrong, Ian D. Gow & David F. Larcker, The Efficacy of
Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 909 (2013)
(reporting finding “virtually no evidence that lower shareholder support for, or even the out-
right rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in future CEO incen-
tive compensation or firm-wide stock option grants”).
7 See David F. Larcker, Allan L. McCall & Gaizka Ormazabal, Outsourcing Shareholder
Voting to Proxy Advisory Firms, 58 J. L. & ECON. 173 (2015)
8 See id. at 173 (finding that “a substantial number of firms change their compensation
programs in the time period before the formal shareholder vote in a manner consistent with the
features known to be favored by proxy advisory firms in an effort to avoid a negative” say on
pay voting recommendation).
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makes it performance-based9 or that the modifications are increasing share-
holder value.10
The say on pay experiment may well be short-lived. President Donald
Trump has vowed to repeal Dodd-Frank, which would eliminate the
mandatory say on pay requirement, although issuers could voluntarily pro-
vide their shareholders with the right to vote on executive pay.11 In contrast,
the Financial CHOICE Act, introduced by House Republicans in early 2017,
would retain say on pay, but would only require it when an issuer materially
changes its executive compensation plan.12 As policymakers consider
whether to retain the say on pay requirement, we examine the message that
shareholders of S&P 1500 issuers are providing to issuers through say on
pay voting.
Through our analysis of say on pay votes cast between 2011 and 2016,
we find that both excess compensation and pay-performance sensitivity af-
fect the level of shareholder support for executive compensation packages.
Surprisingly, however, we also find that, even after controlling for these
variables, a critical additional driver of low shareholder support for execu-
tive compensation packages is the issuer’s economic performance. Say on
pay votes reflect, to a large degree, shareholder dissatisfaction with firm
performance and are not based solely on pay.
We also examined the influence of voting recommendations issued by
Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS)—the largest proxy advisory firm.
Through our examination, we identified two important results. First, as with
voting outcomes, ISS’s recommendations are driven by an issuer’s economic
performance, independent of pay-related variables. Second, we show that
ISS’s evaluation of the CEO’s pay-performance sensitivity uses an ex post
measure of sensitivity and, as such, appears to differ in some measure from
shareholder preferences.
Our findings have two important implications. First, they suggest that
shareholder voting may be a poor tool to address public concerns about the
size and structure of executive compensation. Because of the key role of
economic performance in explaining say on pay voting outcomes, the say on
pay vote operates as a signal of shareholder dissatisfaction with executive
9 See Francis & Lublin, supra note 5 (quoting Dieter Waizenegger, Executive Director of R
CtW Investment Group, as saying that “[c]ompanies could still do more to link leaders’ pay
with long-term corporate performance”).
10 See, e.g., Larcker, et al., supra note 7 (finding negative stock market reaction to changes R
to executive compensation programs adopted in response to proxy advisor guidelines and con-
cluding that “the outsourcing of voting to proxy advisory firms appears to have the unintended
economic consequence that boards of directors are induced to make choices that decrease
shareholder value”).
11 Anders Melin & Caleb Melby, Investors Could Lose Influence Over Executive Pay,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 15, 2016, 5:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-11-
15/say-on-pay-rules-seen-at-risk-as-trump-takes-aim-at-dodd-frank.
12 Joseph A. Hall, Predictions on Dodd-Frank’s Executive Compensation Provisions,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Dec. 14, 2016), https://corpgov.law.har
vard.edu/2016/12/14/predictions-on-dodd-franks-executive-compensation-provisions/.
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pay primarily in poorly performing firms. To the extent that executive pay is
too high or insufficiently tied to performance, these concerns will not lead
shareholders to vote against the pay package as long as the issuer is perform-
ing well. If say on pay is about curbing excessive or inordinate compensa-
tion, it seems to be a rough and inadequate tool.
Second, shareholder support for executive pay seems to be highly cor-
related with an issuer’s short-term stock performance. Shareholders appear to
care a lot about performance, and, to an extent, they are using say on pay to
punish executives for poor performance rather than for excessive pay. As a
result, the say on pay vote may be counterproductive to the extent that it
heightens an executive’s incentives to focus on short-term stock price at the
potential cost of working to enhance firm value.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a brief background on
say on pay, Part III describes our empirical analysis, and Part IV discusses
the implications of our results for the debate over say on pay.
I. BACKGROUND AND EFFECT OF SAY ON PAY
Public criticism of the size and structure of executive compensation
packages at public issuers increased dramatically in the 1990s.13 By the early
2000s, institutional investors began focusing on executive compensation and
seeking—through shareholder proposals and other means—to address pay
practices that were viewed as problematic.14 Academics, most notably Lu-
cian Bebchuk and Jesse Fried, argued that executive pay packages were the
result of insider self-dealing rather than the product of a functioning market
for executive services.15
The financial crisis of 2008 heightened concerns about executive com-
pensation as the public learned that highly-paid executives of financial insti-
13 See, e.g., John E. Core, Wayne Guay & David F. Larcker, The Power of the Pen and
Executive Compensation 14–15 (May 23, 2007) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with au-
thor), http://ssrn.com/abstract=838347 (finding that the increase in compensation related arti-
cles from 1994 to 2002 was approximately 900% and that the percentage of those articles with
a “negative tone” was 36% and 47% among major newspapers and magazines, respectively).
14 See Fabrizio Ferri & David A. Maber, Say on Pay Votes and CEO Compensation: Evi-
dence from the UK, 17 REV. FIN. 527 (2013).
15
LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE UNFULFILLED
PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION ix (2006) (“There is now recognition that many
boards have employed compensation arrangements that do not serve shareholders’ interests.”).
Some academics have challenged this view. See., e.g., Steven N. Kaplan, CEO Pay and Cor-
porate Governance in the U.S.: Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, 25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN.
8 (2013) (citing evidence that CEO compensation is not excessive and that it is highly corre-
lated with corporate performance). One of the authors of this Article has argued that the in-
crease in compensation was ironically linked to the requirement to disclose pay information by
public issuers. See Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 599, 624 n.101 (2013) (citing Kenneth R. Davis, Taking Stock—Salary and Options
Too: The Looting Of Corporate America, 69 MD. L. REV. 419, 445, 447 (2010)).
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tutions16 had engaged in risky business strategies that contributed to financial
instability, according to many commentators.17 In response, Congress—
through Dodd-Frank—required the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to compel publicly-traded issuers to provide their shareholders with
the opportunity to cast a non-binding vote on executive compensation.18
The rules adopted by the SEC implementing say on pay, which were
effective for shareholder meetings on and after January 21, 2011, provide
shareholders with three separate votes.19 Shareholders have: (1) the right to
vote on executive compensation at least once every three years (“say on
pay”);20 (2) the right to vote on whether to have a say on pay vote yearly,
biannually, or triennially (“say on frequency”);21 and (3) the right to vote on
executive severance packages (“say on golden parachutes”).22 The rules ap-
ply to issuers with more than $75 million in public equity float and to the
compensation packages of the issuer’s five most highly-compensated execu-
tive officers as identified in the issuer’s proxy statement.23 The rules also
provide for increased compensation disclosure to shareholders.24
Say on pay in the U.S. was modeled on the then-existing U.K. say on
pay procedures, which commentators described as having desirable results.25
Since 2003, U.K. issuers have been required to provide shareholders with a
remuneration report, which is then approved by shareholder vote.26 Initially
16 See, e.g., Louise Story & Eric Dash, Bankers Reaped Lavish Bonuses During Bailouts,
N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2009, at A1 (“Thousands of top traders and bankers on Wall Street were
awarded huge bonuses and pay packages last year, even as their employers were battered by
the financial crisis.”).
17 See, e.g., Press Release, Federal Reserve, Federal Reserve issues proposed guidance on
incentive compensation (Oct. 22, 2009) (quoting Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20091022a.htm (“Compensation prac-
tices at some banking organizations have led to misaligned incentives and excessive risk-tak-
ing, contributing to bank losses and financial instability.”). See also Lucian A. Bebchuk &
Jesse M. Fried, Paying for Long-Term Performance, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1915, 1917 (2010)
(“The crisis of 2008-2009 has led to widespread recognition that pay arrangements that reward
executives for short-term results can produce incentives to take excessive risks.”).
18 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, supra note 1. R
19 Shareholder Approval of Executive Compensation and Golden Parachute Compensa-
tion, 76 Fed. Reg. 6010 (Feb. 2, 2011) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 229, 240 and 249).
20 See id. at 6013.
21 See id. at 6017.
22 See id. at 6024–25.
23 See SEC Small Entity Compliance Guide, Shareholder Approval of Executive Compen-
sation and Golden Parachute Compensation, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/33-9178-secg.htm.
24 See 76 Fed. Reg., supra note 19, at 6026–27. R
25 See, e.g., Ferri & Maber, supra note 14, at 530 (“UK investors perceived say on pay to R
be a value enhancing monitoring mechanism and were successful in using say on pay votes to
pressure firms to remove controversial pay practices and increase the sensitivity of pay to poor
performance.”); see also Andrew Lund, Say on Pay’s Bundling Problems, 99 KENTUCKY L.
REV. 119 (2010) (drawing on the U.K. experience on say on pay to argue that say on pay votes
may be skewed due to shareholder hesitancy to punish executives at high-performing firms).
26 Edward F. Greene & Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP, Binding Shareholder Say-
on-Pay Vote in UK, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (July 31, 2012),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/07/31/binding-shareholder-say-on-pay-vote-in-uk/.
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the shareholder vote was advisory, but in 2013, the U.K. amended its direc-
tor remuneration rules to make the votes binding for listed firms.27 Various
forms of say on pay requirements have also been adopted in other
jurisdictions.28
In its early years, the results of the say on pay votes do not appear to
demonstrate widespread shareholder dissatisfaction with executive pay pack-
ages. Since say on pay became mandatory in 2011, shareholders have ap-
proved executive pay at over 90% of firms every year.29 The percentage of
issuers with a say on pay vote disapproving executive pay (a “negative say
on pay vote”) has never exceeded 3%, and that number dropped to 1.7% in
2016.30
Notably, despite frequent claims that institutional investors blindly fol-
low the recommendations of proxy advisory firms, the say on pay voting
results tell a somewhat different story. Although ISS has recommended a
negative vote for approximately 10% to 12% of Russell 3000 issuers per
year, the percentage of those issuers receiving a negative vote is less than
3% annually.31
In addition, say on pay does not appear to have significantly reduced
CEO compensation levels. Following the adoption of Dodd-Frank and the
SEC’s implementation of the say on pay requirement, CEO pay rose.32 In our
sample, CEO pay rose steadily until 2015, then declined slightly for the year.
Median CEO pay in 2010 was $4.215 million and rose to $5.519 million in
2014 before declining to $5.350 million in 2015.
However, the latest statistics from 2016 show CEO pay rebounding and
rising to record levels.33 Studies suggest, however, that say on pay has influ-
enced the structure of executive compensation packages, finding increases in
27 Squire Patton Boggs, UK Executive Remuneration Resource Centre, COMPENSATION
AND BENEFITS GLOBAL INSIGHTS BLOG (Nov. 28, 2016) http://www.globalcompensationin-
sights.com/uk-executive-remuneration-resource-centre/#itemtwo.
28 See Randall S. Thomas & Christoph Van der Elst, Say on Pay Around the World, 92
WASH. U. L. REV. 653 (2015) (describing adoption of say on pay votes around the world and
evaluating their effects). Other studies have examined the effect of say on pay in multiple
countries. See, e.g., Ricardo Correa & Ugur Lel, Say on pay laws, executive compensation, pay
slice, and firm valuation around the world, 122 J. FIN ECON. 500 (2016) (finding that say on
pay works internationally based on a study of 38 countries from 2001 through 2012). How-
ever, because the composition and incentives of shareholders vary substantially around the
world, it is difficult to extrapolate from the experiences in one country to the potential effects
of similar legislation elsewhere.
29 Semler Brossy, supra note 4, at 3. R
30 Id. at 2. Of the remaining 98.3%, 75% passed with at least 90% support and 92% passed
with at least 70% support. The average approval rate was 91%.
31 Id.
32 Ira Kay, Did Say-on-Pay Reduce or “Compress” CEO Pay?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON
CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Mar. 27, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/03/
27/did-say-on-pay-reduce-or-compress-ceo-pay/ (“Median S&P 500 CEO pay increased 27%
for the 4 years after [say on pay] implementation relative to the 3 years preceding [say on
pay].”).
33 Francis & Lublin, supra note 5, at 1. R
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the proportion of pay that is performance-based, as well as a greater align-
ment between pay raises and total shareholder return.34
Although say on pay in the U.S. is relatively new, several academic
studies have examined its effects on pay levels, compensation structures, and
firm value.35 In one early study, Marinilka Kimbro and Danielle Xu looked
at the first two years of say on pay and found evidence that say on pay votes
are sensitive to firm risk, excessive CEO compensation, accounting quality,
and financial performance.36 They also found that boards react to negative
say on pay votes by subsequently reducing excessive compensation.37
A recent paper by Steven Balsam, Jeff Boone, Harrison Liu, and Jen-
nifer Yin studied the say on pay effect on 2010 executive compensation.38 In
that paper, the authors found that management proactively anticipated the
effect of say on pay by modifying compensation plans in advance of the
vote, reducing compensation levels and making pay more performance-
based.39 In addition, the authors documented clear relationships between the
level of shareholder support and pay plan characteristics.40 Specifically,
shareholders cast more votes against pay packages involving higher total
compensation, large increases in compensation, or a higher number of
perks.41
In another paper, Diane Denis, Torsten Jochem, and Anjana Rajamani
examined the influence of peer groups on say on pay votes between 2011
and 2013.42 They found that firms that benchmark their executive pay against
the pay of peer firms that experience a low say on pay vote voluntarily re-
duce the compensation of their own executives.43 These changes to executive
compensation are concentrated in firms that have higher levels of excess
34 See, e.g., Paul Hodgson, Surprise surprise: Say on Pay appears to be working, FORTUNE
(July 8, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/07/08/say-on-pay-ceos/ (reporting an increase in the
alignment between executive pay and total shareholder return, as well as a reduction in perks,
based on WSJ/Hay Group CEO pay survey).
35 A number of studies have analyzed the effect of voluntarily adopted say on pay share-
holder proposals. See, e.g., Vicente Cuñat, Mireia Giné & Maria Guadalupe, Say Pays! Share-
holder Voice and Firm Performance, 20 REV. FIN. 1799 (2015). Because voluntarily-adopted
governance reforms raise questions about selection effects that are difficult to separate from
the effect of the reforms themselves, we do not view these studies as probative on the value of
a legislatively required say on pay vote. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan
& Edward B. Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?, 83 U. CHI. L. REV.
1119, 1148 (2016) (distinguishing between selection and causation in evaluating the effect of
voluntarily adopted majority voting reform).
36 Marinilka B. Kimbro & Danielle Xu, Shareholders have a say in executive compensa-
tion: Evidence from say-on-pay in the United States, 35 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 19 (2016).
37 Id. at 36.
38 Steven Balsam, Jeff Boone, Harrison Liu & Jennifer Yin, The impact of say-on-pay on
executive compensation, 35 J. ACCT. & PUB. POL’Y 162 (2016).
39 Id. at 164.
40 Id. at 188.
41 Id. at 164.
42 Diane K. Denis, Torsten Jochem & Anjana Rajamani, Compensation Benchmarking and
The Peer Effects of Say on Pay, 6, 8–9 (2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2909963.
43 Id.
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CEO compensation.44 The authors concluded that say on pay may “contrib-
ute to an alignment of pay practices among firms that compete with each
other for managerial talent in the executive labor market.”45 Kimbro and Xu
also looked at 2011 and 2012 say on pay votes.46 They found that “share-
holders effectively identify firms with excessive and abnormal levels of
CEO pay and expressed their dissatisfaction through [say on pay].”47 They
further found that firms responded to shareholder dissatisfaction, as ex-
pressed through low say on pay votes, by reducing the subsequent growth of
CEO pay.48
The results of a more recent study are less promising. Kelly Brunarski,
T. Colin Campbell, and Yvette Harman examined board responses to low
say on pay voting outcomes and found that say on pay does not appear to be
improving compensation contracting.49 They found that “these votes are in-
effective in reducing CEO excess compensation, which increases, on aver-
age, in the year following the low-support vote.”50 Brunarski, Campbell, and
Harman also found that—although the firms make cosmetic changes to their
research and development (R&D) expenditures and dividend payouts—they
showed “no change in net cash flows, firm risk, or firm value,” suggesting
that the responses were mere “window-dressing.”51 Further, the study found
that firms with overcompensated executives and strong say on pay support
decreased in value, suggesting that say on pay increased agency problems at
these firms and “ultimately[ ] reduces shareholder wealth.”52
Research consisting of two recent laboratory experiments using Masters
of Business Administration (MBA) students examined the key drivers of say
on pay voting.53 Ryan Krause, Kimberly Whitler, and Matthew Semadeni
found that when MBA students were instructed to behave as shareholders,
they only reacted negatively to high CEO compensation when that compen-
sation was linked to poor firm performance.54 Firm performance, rather than
excess CEO compensation appeared to be the primary driver of the say on
pay vote.55 Notably, the Krause, Whitler, and Semadeni observed that share-
holder approval rates “reflect[ ] the extent to which shareholders view CEO
44 Id.
45 Id. at 35.
46 Kimbro & Xu, supra note 36, at 20. R
47 Id. at 37.
48 Id. at 36.
49 Kelly R. Brunarski, T. Colin Campbell & Yvette S. Harman, Evidence on the outcome
of Say-On-Pay votes: How managers, directors, and shareholders respond, 30 J. CORP. FIN.
132, 134, 147 (2015).
50 Id. at 134 (emphasis removed).
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 Ryan Krause, Kimberly A. Whitler & Matthew Semadeni, Power to the Principals! An
Experimental Look at Shareholder Say-on-Pay Voting, 57 ACAD. MGMT. J. 94 (2014).
54 Id. at 108.
55 See id. at 111.
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pay as justified, given firm performance.”56 The authors ground their analy-
sis of the experiment results in both agency and prospect theory.57 They hy-
pothesize that their subjects analyze CEO compensation less from the
perspective of agency costs than from prospect theory.58 Terming this an
“agency-normative assessment,” they hypothesize that shareholders decide
how to vote by determining whether they think “CEO pay [is] justified,
given firm performance.”59 The results of their experiment are consistent
with this hypothesis.60
Although Krause, Whitler, and Semadeni’s analysis provides a valuable
theoretical framework for understanding shareholder voting behavior, the
experimental design limits the power of their findings. As they acknowl-
edge, it is difficult to predict the extent to which MBA students in a labora-
tory setting will replicate the real-world voting decisions of institutional
investors.61 They observe that “analysis of actual vote outcomes, once data
become available, will provide insight into whether the results of our study
accurately reflect the circumstances surrounding say-on-pay votes.”62
Krause, Whitler, and Semadeni’s theoretical framework is the starting
point for our empirical analysis. In understanding the effect of a say on pay
vote in the real world, it is critical to understand what the vote represents.
When shareholders demonstrate a low level of support for management
compensation through their say on pay votes, the factors that drive their
votes clarify the information that shareholders convey to the board. We col-
lected data to examine this question and to determine whether real world
shareholders behave consistently with the results predicted by the Krause,
Whitler, and Semadeni experiment.63 Specifically, our empirical analysis al-
lowed us to separately test the effects of firm performance and the size and
structure of executive compensation on the say on pay vote. We find, as
detailed below, that although shareholder votes are sensitive to excess com-
pensation, they are also highly sensitive to firm performance. Indeed, in the
absence of poor economic performance, shareholders do not appear to care
about excess executive compensation. If a company is performing poorly,
however, shareholders care significantly about executive pay.
Our results further explain, in part, the substantial gap between voting
outcomes and ISS recommendations on say on pay. We highlight the fact
that ISS and shareholders appear to evaluate pay-performance sensitivity
very differently. Specifically, ISS focuses on realized pay for performance
56 See id. at 108–09. This finding is in line also with the theories of Professor Lund. See
Lund, supra note 25 (theorizing that shareholders would not want to discipline executives at R
high performing firms through say on pay votes).
57 Krause, et al. supra note 53, at 94. R
58 Id.
59 Id. at 100.
60 Id. at 111.
61 See id. at 110.
62 Id.
63 See supra Part III.A.
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rather than ex ante pay.64 For reasons that we discuss further below, it is
unclear if this methodology is the most appropriate for evaluating executive
compensation packages.
II. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
A. Data Collection
We collected data on executive compensation, firm accounting and
stock return performance, and shareholder meeting votes. We examined ex-
ecutive compensation plans that were effective between 2010 and 2015 and
that were the subjects of say on pay votes at annual meetings from 2011 to
2016.65 For data on executive pay, we used the ExecuComp database. For
information on firm characteristics and accounting performance, we used the
Compustat database. For stock prices, we used the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) database. Information on shareholder meetings and
ISS recommendations was taken from the ISS database.
We derived our sample by taking all domestically incorporated firms
listed in CRSP between 2010 and 2015. We then excluded firms for which
full information is not available in the ExecuComp or ISS database. The
final sample represents all of the data, including 5,541 observations, consist-
ing of 1,345 unique issuers.
B. Empirical Analysis
Table I below provides descriptive statistics on our sample.
64 See Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizio Ferri & David Oesch, Shareholder Votes and Proxy Advi-
sors: Evidence from Say on Pay, 51 J. ACCT. RES. 951, 958, 961 (2013) (describing ISS’s
approach of analyzing change in realized CEO pay from the prior year).
65 The SEC’s rules implementing say on pay were effective for shareholder meetings on or
after January 21, 2011. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-21 (2017) (“[T]he registrant shall, for the
first annual or other meeting of shareholders on or after January 21, 2011, . . . include a
separate resolution subject to shareholder advisory vote to approve the compensation of its
named executive officers, as disclosed pursuant to Item 402 of Regulation S-K.”). The rules
are backward-looking in that shareholders at a given annual meeting approve the compensation
plan in place during the prior fiscal year. See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2017) (requiring disclosure
with respect to the “last completed fiscal year”).
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TABLE I: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Name Means Medians Standard  
Deviation 
Panel A: Company Variables  
Excess Compensation ($thousands) $1,054.0 $362.75 $4,492.83 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity ($thousands) $1,071.9 $241.67 $1,1139 
Stock Returns 0.199 0.166 0.362 
Return on Assets 0.060 0.054 0.075 
Ratio of Debt to Assets 0.212 0.189 0.193 
Logarithm of Total Assets ($Bn) $7.999 $7.851 $1.640 
R&D ($$MM) $173.89 0 $784.2 
Missing R&D 0.545 1 0.498 
Delaware Incorporated 0.639 1 0.480 
Dual Class Stock 0.047 0 0.211 
Insider Ownership (%) 0.983 0 3.386 
ISS Negative Recommendation  0.110 0 0.313 
Panel B: Voting Outcomes 
Fraction Against (Mean)  0.091 0.039 0.129 
Low Vote (<80% Support) 0.136 0 0.343 
Our research focuses on two components of executive pay: (1) excess
compensation and (2) pay-performance sensitivity.66 “Excess compensa-
tion” is a variable that is based on the work of Core, Guay, and Larcker,
who define excess compensation as the amount of compensation exceeding a
predicted compensation level based on economic determinants such as “firm
size, growth opportunities, stock return, accounting return, and industry con-
trols.”67 In our sample, the mean excess compensation is $1.054 million, but
there is significant variation as illustrated by the high standard deviation of
66 The say on pay rules require issuers to disclose a variety of detailed information about
the various components of executive compensation. The degree to which these components
affect shareholder voting is unclear. At least one paper has concluded that “shareholders focus
on the top-line remuneration figure when deciding how to vote . . . [and that] [n]one of the
variables that capture the various aspects of the CEO’s remuneration package seems to influ-
ence the voting behavior of shareholders significantly.” Carsten Gerner-Beuerle & Tom Kirch-
maier, Say on Pay: Do Shareholders Care?, FMG Discussion Paper DP751 (2016), https://ssrn
.com/abstract=2720481.
67 Core et. al, supra note 13, at 2 (defining excess compensation as “the residual from an R
expected compensation model that controls for standard economic determinants”).
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$4.493 million. The median excess compensation is $362.75 thousand,
meaning that excess compensation is skewed toward the higher end.
“Pay-performance sensitivity” is a measurement of the CEO’s total pay
to performance sensitivity. Our variable uses the methodology of Core and
Guay, who create an options portfolio “using the precise characteristics of
newly granted options and the average characteristics of previously granted
non-exercisable and exercisable options.”68 In our sample, the CEO’s pay-
performance sensitivity is also right-skewed with the average pay-perform-
ance sensitivity being $1.072 million with a median of $241.67 thousand and
a standard deviation of $1.114 million. Critically, this methodology mea-
sures CEO pay on an ex ante basis—expected pay for future performance.69
“Stock returns” is the stock return of the company for the relevant fis-
cal year. The average yearly stock return for the firms in our sample during
the 2010 to 2015 time period was 19.9%. During this time period the aver-
age yearly market return for the S&P 500 was 18.41%.
“Return on assets” is the return on the assets of the company for a
particular year as measured in the Compustat database. The return on assets
we calculated averaged 6% compared to the 6.23% average of the S&P 500
during the sample time period.
“Ratio of debt to assets” for a company is the ratio of debt to assets
measured as of year-end for each fiscal year in our sample. “Total assets” is
the natural logarithm of the total assets of the company as of year-end in
each fiscal year in our sample. The size of the issuers in our sample is large
with an average natural logarithm of total assets of $8 billion, which is not
surprising given that ExecuComp provides CEO compensation data on S&P
1500 firms.
“R&D” is the ratio of research and development expenses to company
assets. “Missing R&D” is a dummy variable that is set to “1” if information
is missing for a given year for research and development figures, and “0”
otherwise.
“Delaware Incorporated” is a dummy variable that is set to “1” if the
firm is incorporated in Delaware and “0” otherwise. The percentage of com-
panies incorporated in Delaware, is 63.9% which is consistent with other
studies.70 “Dual Class Stock” is a dummy variable that is set to “1” if the
firm is coded in ISS as having a multiple class stock structure. These firms
typically are controlled by insiders and thus may have different salary struc-
tures. Additionally, due to their lack of control, minority shareholders at dual
class companies may be more likely to want to express their opinions
through a say on pay vote. “Insider Ownership %” is the percentage owner-
68 John E. Core & Wayne Guay, Estimating the Value of Employee Stock Option Portfolios
and Their Sensitivities to Price and Volatility, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 613, 614 (2002).
69 Id. at 617 (using the Black-Scholes formula to calculate option value at time of grant).
70 See Matthew D. Cain, Stephen McKeon & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Do takeover laws
matter? Evidence from five decades of hostile takeovers, 124 J. FIN. ECON. 464, 482 (2017)
(finding that, in a somewhat different sample, 54.8% of firms were incorporated in Delaware).
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ship of the company held by officers and directors as recorded in the Com-
pustat database.
“ISS Negative Recommendation” is a dummy variable that is set to
“1” if ISS recommended against the say on pay proposal, and “0” other-
wise. In our sample, ISS recommended against 11% of the say on pay
proposals.
In terms of voting outcomes, we define the “fraction against,” calcu-
lated as votes against divided by the sum of all votes for and votes against.71
In our sample, the average percent vote against was 9.1% while the median
percent vote against was 3.89%. We define “low say on pay vote” as a
dummy variable equal to “1” if the percentage against vote is greater than or
equal to 20%,72 and “0” otherwise. Using this criterion, 13.6% of say on pay
proposals received low say on pay votes.
We note that a 20% “against” vote is lower than the legal standard for
say on pay failure, which is a majority vote. We use this lower standard for
three reasons. First, because the say on pay vote is advisory, the 50% thresh-
old is purely symbolic. Second, very few say on pay votes receive a majority
of votes against, which would greatly reduce the power of our empirical
tests. Specifically, a mere 2.2% of votes in our sample actually received less
than 50% of the vote. Third, and perhaps most importantly, our approach is
consistent with that of existing literature on this topic—that issuers view a
vote of 20% against an issuer or issuer-sponsored proposal as significant,73
and that such a level of dissent is substantially more likely to generate an
issuer response.74 We follow the methodology of prior academic studies by
characterizing a high level of dissent as receiving less than 80% of the
vote.75
As discussed in Part I, ISS recommendations are a significant driver of
say on pay results.76 Receiving a negative recommendation from ISS gener-
71 We excluded non-votes and abstentions from the denominator.
72 A similar approach has been used by others in this field of study. See, e.g., Diane Del
Guercio, Laura Seery & Tracie Woidtke, Do boards pay attention when institutional investor
activists “just vote no”?, 90 J. FIN. ECON. 84, 89 (2008) (using withhold vote threshold of 20%
as an indication of “substantial support” for a withhold campaign); Yonca Ertimur, Fabrizzio
Ferri & Volkan Muslu, Shareholder Activism and CEO Pay, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 535, 546
(2011); Kimbro & Xu, supra note 36, at 21 (terming firms with a say on pay rejection vote of R
more than 20% “high-dissent firms”).
73 See GEORGESON, SAY ON PAY PRIMER (July 28, 2017), http://www.georgeson.com/
News/Say-on-Pay-Primer.pdf (“Thus, opposition votes of higher than 20-25 percent invites
greater scrutiny by the advisory firms of a company’s compensation practices. The company is
expected to engage in a shareholder outreach and likely make pay changes based on investor
feedback.”). See also Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Who Calls the Shots?, 3
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 35, 39 (2013) (defining “high withhold votes” as those in which more
than 30% of votes are withheld from a director candidate in board elections).
74 See, e.g., Ferri & Maber, supra note 14, at 531 (reporting that a say on pay dissent of R
higher than 20% “results in boards implementing 75%-80% of shareholder requests to remove
specific provisions”).
75 See e.g., id.
76 See supra Part I.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\8-1\HLB102.txt unknown Seq: 14 25-JUN-18 12:57
114 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 8
ates a 336.1% increase in the average probability of a vote of greater than
20% against the say on pay proposal. Receiving a negative recommendation
from ISS also generates a 283.2% increase in the probability of receiving a
similarly low vote. ISS recommendations are thus exceedingly important in
the outcome of say on pay votes. We explore further below the extent to
which these recommendations reflect shareholder sentiment on the issue and
the causes of such sentiment.
In Table II we analyze the determinants of ISS recommendations with
respect to say on pay votes. We ran Probit regressions using as the depen-
dent variable whether ISS has recommended for or against a particular say
on pay proposal. Specifically, the dependent variable is set to “1” if ISS
recommended against the say on pay proposal, and set to “0” if it did not.
Given that the dependent variable is binary, we ran a Probit regression rather
than a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. During our time
period, ISS recommended a vote against 11% (609 out of a total of 5,541) of
the say on pay proposals (i.e., ISS recommended that shareholders vote
“no” on the proposal).
TABLE II: DETERMINANTS OF ISS “NO” RECOMMENDATION
(PROBIT REGRESSIONS)
Independent Variables Regression 
Coefficient 
Z-Statistic 
Excess Compensation (10-4) 0.141*** 10.48 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity (10-5) 0.135 1.60 
Stock Returns  -0.117*** -7.52 
Return on Assets -0.245*** -3.65 
Ratio of Debt to Assets  0.039* 1.67 
Total Assets  -0.007* -1.82 
R&D  0.000*** 2.81 
Missing R&D 0.017* 1.73 
Delaware Incorporated 0.023** 2.29 
Dual Class Stock 0.016 0.79 
Insider Ownership 0.001 1.03 
Constant -1.097*** -6.13 
Pseudo R2 0.125  
*** statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; and *
statistically significant at 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level.
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In our model, the coefficient on excess compensation is positive and
statistically significant, meaning that excess compensation—compensation
levels beyond that predicted by the standard economic variables—is a large
driver of an ISS “no” recommendation. This is consistent with ISS’s stated
methodology for evaluating compensation packages in which it evaluates
compensation “relative both to market peers and to absolute shareholder
returns.”77
The coefficient on pay-performance sensitivity is positive, but not sta-
tistically significant. This result is somewhat surprising. ISS reports that its
methodology is designed to capture the sensitivity of executive compensa-
tion to firm performance and that a “misalignment” between pay and per-
formance is a substantial factor driving its say on pay recommendations.78
Our results suggest, however, that pay-performance sensitivity is not a sig-
nificant factor in negative ISS recommendations. The reason for this result is
likely a difference between our methodology and that used by ISS. ISS cal-
culates pay-performance sensitivity on an ex post basis—that is, pay relative
to realized performance.79 In contrast, the Core and Guay methodology that
we utilize is an ex ante measure—expected pay for future performance.80 It
is unclear which method is more appropriate for measuring pay-performance
sensitivity. On the one hand, the ex ante measure most accurately reflects the
incentives created by the compensation package. To the extent that pay-per-
formance sensitivity is designed to reduce agency costs by aligning the inter-
ests of management and shareholders, ex ante sensitivity seems to be the
appropriate measure.81 On the other hand, realized compensation measures
the actual money that CEOs take home (rather than a predicted value), which
may be more useful when assessing pay for performance.82 Regardless, our
results do not indicate that the ex ante pay performance sensitivity measure
is a factor in ISS “no” recommendations.
Finally, the coefficients on stock returns and return on assets are nega-
tive and statistically significant. This means that firm economic performance
plays a substantial role in driving ISS recommendations—issuers with poor
77 Carol Bowie, Steve Silberglied & Liz Williams, Evaluating Pay for Performance Align-
ment, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS. 3 (2014), https://www.issgovernance.com/file/publica-
tions/evaluatingpayforperformance.pdf.
78 See id. (explaining that ISS methodology is “designed to identify outlier companies that
have demonstrated significant misalignment between CEO pay and company performance
over time”).
79 See Ertimur et. al, supra note 64, at 958 (explaining ISS methodology). R
80 See Core & Guay, supra note 68, at 614. R
81 See, e.g., Martin J. Conyon, John E. Core & Wayne R. Guay, Are US CEOs Paid More
than UK CEOs? Inferences From Risk-Adjusted Pay, 24 REV. FIN. STUD. 402, 415 (2011)
(explaining the rationale for analyzing executive pay in terms of the incentives it creates for
CEO behavior).
82 See Kaplan, supra note 15, at 9 (explaining that actual or realized pay is “a better R
measure of the amount of money the CEO actually takes home in a given year,” and thus more
useful when considering whether CEOs are paid for performance, because it includes the
CEO’s salary, bonus, the value of the restricted stock granted and the value of the options
exercised by the CEO that year).
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economic performance are more likely to receive a negative recommenda-
tion with respect to the say on pay vote.
Examining the control variables, we find that smaller firms and firms
with higher R&D expenses are more likely to get a “no” recommendation
from ISS. Our finding on firms with higher R&D expenses is particularly
troubling. Commentators have argued that shareholders who unduly focus
on short-term profitability may pressure executives to cut R&D, sacrificing
long-term growth in favor of short-term profitability. Our findings imply that
ISS recommendations may contribute to this scenario. Finally, we find that a
firm’s leverage ratio has no significant effect on the ISS recommendation.
In sum, we find that higher excess compensation is correlated with an
ISS “no” recommendation. We also show that, after controlling for pay-
related variables, economic performance remains a significant factor. We
will assess the economic magnitude of these variables in Table VI after ex-
ploring their influence on actual voting outcomes in Table III.
Table III shows the correlation between the same economic variables
and voting outcomes as Table II. We define the dependent variable “fraction
against” as votes against executive compensation divided by the sum of
votes for and votes against. Given that this variable is a fraction bounded
between zero and one, we ran a Tobit regression rather than the standard
OLS regression. We find that a median value of 3.89% (216 out of a total of
5,541) of the say on pay proposals received a “no” vote during the time
period of our study.
As with Table II, the coefficient on excess compensation is again posi-
tive and statistically significant, meaning that higher levels of excess com-
pensation are correlated with greater shareholder dissent (lower shareholder
support). Notably, the excess compensation coefficient in this table is
0.401*10-5, larger in magnitude than the coefficient of 0.141*10-4 in Table II,
indicating that the impact of excess compensation less on ISS recommenda-
tions than on actual shareholder votes.
The independent pay-performance sensitivity variable is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level. This means, that the probability of a
“no” vote is lower when a CEO has a greater pay-performance sensitivity.
In other words, unlike ISS which does not appear to take this issue into
account, shareholders are more likely to support pay packages in which the
CEO’s pay is highly sensitive to performance on an ex ante basis, that is,
when the pay package more closely aligns the CEO’s incentives with share-
holder interests. These results further explain the gap between the number of
issuers that receive a negative ISS recommendation and those that receive a
low say on pay vote from shareholders in that shareholders, but not ISS,
appear to be crediting issuers for ex ante pay sensitivity.
As with Table II, stock returns and return on assets are negative and
statistically significant at the 1% level. Again, this means that, after control-
ling for the size and structure of the pay package, shareholders are less likely
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TABLE III: DETERMINANTS OF FRACTION AGAINST
Independent Variables Regression 
Coefficient 
Z-Statistic 
Excess Compensation (10-5) 0.401*** 6.30 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity (10-6) -0.279** -2.18 
Stock Returns -0.013*** -4.90 
Return on Assets -0.118*** -6.08 
Ratio of Debt to Assets 0.002 0.30 
Total Assets 0.002** 2.13 
R&D -0.000 -0.08 
Missing R&D -0.003 -1.19 
Delaware Incorporated 0.006** 2.03 
Dual Class Stock -0.049*** -5.52 
Insider Ownership  -0.001* -1.84 
ISS Negative Recommendation 0.308*** 45.27 
Constant 0.048*** 6.49 
Pseudo R2 -0.848  
*** statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; and *
statistically significant at 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level.
to vote in favor of executive compensation when the issuer has experienced
poor economic performance.
It is worth noting the results of three additional variables, total assets,
dual class stock and ISS negative recommendation. The total assets coeffi-
cient is positive and statistically significant, meaning that shareholders are
less likely to vote against pay packages at large issuers. This result is inter-
esting both because pay levels tend to increase with issuer size and because
the percentage of institutional ownership is also correlated with issuer size.
To the extent that institutional investors are more likely to be critical of ex-
ecutive pay, as some commentators have observed,83 this result is in tension
with that hypothesis.
83 See BROADRIDGE & PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2016 PROXY SEASON PREVIEW 2 (1st
ed. 2016), http://media.broadridge.com/documents/ProxyPulse-First-Edition-2016.pdf
(“Among the companies that failed to attain majority shareholder approval for executive com-
pensation plans, retail investors cast 66% of their votes in favor of these plans while institu-
tions cast 65% of their votes against.”); David Bogoslaw, Retail Investors Seen as Key to
Firms Struggling on Say-on-Pay, Says ProxyPulse, IR MAGAZINE (Oct. 8, 2013), https://www
.irmagazine.com/articles/proxy-voting-annual-meetings/19800/retail-investors-seen-key-firms-
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The coefficient on dual class stock is negative and highly significant,
meaning that shareholders are more likely to vote “no” on say on pay votes
at dual class stock firms. This finding is consistent with the notion that say
on pay votes may be used to express dissatisfaction with metrics other than
pay itself. In this case, the lower votes may be a product of the lack of a
governance voice in other areas.
In accordance with our preceding analysis, the effect of a negative ISS
recommendation is positive and statistically significant, meaning that ISS
recommendations substantially influence say on pay voting outcomes. Nota-
bly, and in line with other research, we find an independent effect associated
with the ISS recommendation.84 At the same time, the ISS recommendation
does not fully explain the voting results. In unreported results, we ran the
regressions with and without the ISS control variable. Consistent with our
reported results, the coefficients on the other variables are larger when we do
not control for ISS but, as shown here, most of the variables retain statistical
significance even when we control for the ISS effect.
Table IV below shows the results of a regression in which we treat the
say on pay vote as a binary rather than a continuous variable. We define a
low say on pay vote as a resolution that receives shareholder support of less
than 80% by creating a summary variable that is equal to “1” if the percent-
age of votes against is greater than or equal to 20%, and “0” otherwise.
Given that the dependent variable is binary, we ran a Probit regression rather
than a standard OLS regression.
In the Probit regression, the coefficient on excess compensation is posi-
tive and statistically significant at the 1% level, meaning that higher excess
compensation is correlated with an increased likelihood of more than 20% of
the shares being voted against the compensation plan. However, the pay-
performance sensitivity variable is not statistically significant, suggesting
that greater pay-performance sensitivity does not affect the likelihood of a
low say on pay vote. The coefficients on stock returns and return on assets
remain negative and statistically significant, meaning that issuers with better
economic performance are less likely to experience a low say on pay vote.
Dual class stock again remains negative and highly statistically significant.
The ISS variable is positive and statistically significant—a “no” recommen-
dation from ISS is correlated with a low vote. Again, this highlights the
influence of ISS.
The results in Table IV largely mirror those in Table III with the excep-
tion of the results on pay-performance sensitivity. They indicate that al-
struggling-say-pay-says-proxypulse (stating that retail investors showed greater support for
say-on-pay plans than institutional investors).
84 See, e.g., Jie Cai, Jacqueline L. Garner & Ralph A. Walkling, Electing Directors, 64 J.
FIN. 2389 (2009) (reporting that ISS recommendation against a director based on governance
characteristics reduces director votes by 20.7% on average); Stephen Choi, Jill Fisch & Marcel
Kahan, The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or Reality?, 59 EMORY L.J. 869, 906 (2010) (find-
ing independent effect of 6-10% of ISS recommendations in uncontested director elections).
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TABLE IV: DETERMINANTS OF LOW VOTE (PROBIT REGRESSIONS)
Independent Variables Regression 
Coefficient 
Z-Statistic 
Excess Compensation (10-5) 0.704*** 4.54 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity (10-5) 0.124 0.54 
Stock Returns -0.033*** -2.71 
Return on Assets -0.266*** -4.04 
Ratio of Debt to Assets -0.002 -0.06 
Total Assets  0.002 0.70 
R&D 0.000 0.12 
Missing R&Ds -0.018* -1.75 
Delaware Incorporated 0.025** 2.45 
Dual Class Stock -0.247*** -6.02 
Insider Ownership  -0.002 -1.09 
ISS Negative Recommendation 0.386*** 18.53 
Constant -1.758*** -9.82 
Pseudo R2 0.524  
*** statistically significant at 1% level; ** statistically significant at 5% level; and *
statistically significant at 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the
firm level.
though excess compensation is an important driver of low say on pay votes,
so is the performance of the company, even when controlling for excess
compensation. The absence of a significant result on the pay-performance
sensitivity variable is interesting because it suggests the possibility that—
from a shareholder perspective—actual excess compensation is more impor-
tant than the structure of such compensation. On this point, the results
demonstrate that, to some extent, ISS and shareholders appear to agree to
some extent in their analysis of when a pay package is problematic, though
as the results in Table III show, there is some divergence.
Thus far, we have not focused on the relative importance of CEO pay
and economic performance with respect to voting outcomes. Table V below
addresses that issue. We divided our sample into four quartiles based on the
amount of CEO excess compensation.85 We then sorted those quartiles based
on firm economic performance. The resulting matrix—Table V—shows the
85 See supra Table IV. Based on the results described in Table IV, we focus here on excess
compensation rather than pay-performance sensitivity.
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percentage of votes against for each combination of excess pay and eco-
nomic performance, measured in terms of stock price.
TABLE V: QUARTILE ANALYSIS OF CEO PAY
 CEO Pay = Excess Pay Returns 
   High   Low 
   Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 
% against Low Q1 4.45% 4.57% 5.30% 7.45% 
  Q2 4.78% 4.74% 6.67% 9.77% 
  Q3 7.41% 7.54% 8.22% 12.32% 
 High Q4 11.40% 13.90% 15.86% 22.42% 
As shown in Table V above, although shareholders are somewhat sensi-
tive to excess CEO pay when stock price performance is strong, their reac-
tion is limited. Even firms in the highest quartile of excess CEO pay receive
only 11.4% of votes against their compensation package if they are in the
top quartile in terms of stock price performance. By contrast, for firms with
the same level of excess pay that are in the lowest performance quartile, the
level of negative votes almost doubles.
Relatedly, poor stock price performance appears to result in greater
shareholder dissatisfaction with executive pay packages even in the absence
of excess compensation. In particular, for the firms in the lowest quartile
with respect to excess compensation, overall levels of say on pay dissent are
quite low. Nonetheless, the percentage of votes cast against the pay package
increases by 41% as we move from the highest performing firms to the low-
est performers. This increase appears to be driven by stock price perform-
ance, not by pay. The most compelling situation is the fact that, in our
sample, we have 149 cases in which, even though the CEO received no
excess compensation, the percentage of shares voted against the compensa-
tion package exceeded 20%.
Finally, our prior tables documented the importance of both economic
performance and CEO pay with respect to ISS recommendations and say on
pay voting outcomes. In Table VI below, we quantify how much these fac-
tors matter.
Table VI shows the effect of an increase of one standard deviation in
each independent variable from Tables II and III—the compensation vari-
ables (excess compensation and pay-performance sensitivity) and the per-
formance variables (stock returns and return on assets). As shown in Table I,
the standard deviation of excess compensation is $4.492 million and the
standard deviation of pay-performance sensitivity is $1.1139 million. Table
VI then shows, in each column, the effect of increasing these variables by
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TABLE VI: ECONOMIC EFFECT OF KEY VARIABLES
  
ISS Negative  
Recommendation
(using regression 
estimates from  
Table II) 
% Against 
(using 
regression 
estimates 
from Table 
III) 
Low Vote 
(using 
regression 
estimates 
from Table 
IV) 
Excess Compensation 57.64% 19.70% 23.18% 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity 0.00% -3.40% 0.00% 
Total Effect of Pay 
(Absolute Terms) 57.64% 23.10% 23.18% 
Stock Returns -38.70% -5.31% -8.72% 
Return on Assets -16.78% -9.68% -14.64% 
Total Effect of Performance
(Absolute Terms) 55.48% 14.99% 23.36% 
one standard deviation, respectively, the probability of a “no” recommenda-
tion from ISS, the fraction of votes cast against say on pay, and the
probability of a low say on pay vote, meaning that fewer than 80% of shares
were voted in favor of the compensation package.
The first column of Table VI shows the effect of CEO pay and firm
performance on the probability of receiving a “no” recommendation on say
on pay from ISS. A one standard deviation increase in excess compensation
results in a 57.64% increase in the average probability of an ISS “no” rec-
ommendation.86 This result is consistent with what we might expect, namely,
that ISS is substantially more likely to recommend against a pay package
when excess compensation increases. Similarly, increasing pay-performance
sensitivity by one standard deviation results in a zero change in the
probability of an ISS “no” recommendation. The sum of these two pay-
related effects is 57.64%. This means that a one standard deviation increase
in both excess compensation and pay-performance sensitivity will increase
the average probability of an ISS “no” recommendation by 57.64%. This
finding demonstrates the importance of pay-related factors in explaining the
ISS recommendation.
The third and fourth rows of the first column of Table VI examine the
importance of the performance variables—stock returns and return on assets.
Again, we assess the effect of increasing firm performance by one standard
deviation on the average probability of receiving a negative say on pay vote
recommendation from ISS. Importantly, we calculated these effects while
holding constant the compensation variables reflected in the first and second
86 This can be calculated as (.0000141*4492.54/.111). All other probabilities are similarly
calculated.
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rows of Table VI. A one standard deviation increase of .3623 in stock returns
is associated with a 38.70% decrease in the average probability of a “no”
recommendation from ISS. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase in
return on assets, is associated with a 16.78% decrease in the average
probability of a “no” recommendation from ISS. Summing these two ef-
fects, we find that our performance variables yield a combined 55.48% de-
crease in the average probability of a “no” recommendation from ISS.
In the second column of Table VI, we examine the effect of a one stan-
dard deviation change in our independent variables on the fraction of votes
cast against a company’s executive compensation plan. Using the same met-
rics, we find that a one standard deviation increase in excess compensation
correlates to, on average, a 19.70% increase in the fraction of shares voted
against the compensation plan. A one standard deviation in pay-performance
sensitivity is associated with a 3.40% decrease in the average fraction of
votes against the proposal. The joint effect of 23.10% is significantly smaller
than the effect of the pay variables on the ISS recommendation suggesting
that shareholders do not necessarily vote against a compensation package on
the basis of a negative recommendation from ISS. This result is consistent
with our observations elsewhere.
We also examine the effect of the performance variables. We find that a
one standard deviation increase in stock returns is associated with an average
decrease in the fraction of votes against the compensation plan of 5.31%. A
one standard deviation increase in return on assets results in a decrease in the
average fraction of votes cast against the plan of 9.68%. The total is a joint
effect of 14.99%. Importantly, this effect is net of the pay variables, that is,
for a given level of excess compensation and pay-performance sensitivity, a
one standard deviation increase in the performance variables alone will re-
duce the fraction of votes against the compensation plan by an average of
14.99%.
In the third column of Table VI, we examine the extent to which pay
and performance factors contribute to the probability of a low say on pay
vote, which we defined above as fewer than 80% of shares voted in favor of
the compensation package. We find that a one standard deviation increase in
excess compensation results in the average probability of a low vote increas-
ing by 23.18%. A one standard deviation change in pay-performance sensi-
tivity results in the average probability of a low vote changing by zero. We
mark this change as “0” since the coefficient on pay-performance sensitivity
in Table IV is not significant.
Looking at the performance variables, we find that a one standard
deviation increase in stock returns results in the probability of a low vote
decreasing by an average of 8.72%. A one standard deviation increase in
return on assets results in the probability of a low vote decreasing by an
average of 14.64%. The joint effect of the two performance variables is
23.36%. Again, this effect is net of, or in addition to, the effect of the pay
variables.
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In Table VII we reran the same models that were used to generate the
results given in Table VI. However, in this model we did not use continuous
variables for stock returns and return on assets. Instead, each is a dummy
variable. Stock returns is set to “1” if the stock return is negative and “0”
otherwise. Return on assets is similarly set to “1” if return on assets is nega-
tive and “0” otherwise. We performed this test in order to assess how share-
holders respond to economic performance when performance is simply
negative rather than relative.
TABLE VII: ECONOMIC EFFECT OF KEY VARIABLES
USING DUMMY VARIABLES
  
ISS Negative  
Recommendation
(using regression 
estimates from 
Table II) 
Fraction  
Against  
(using 
regression 
estimates 
from Table 
III) 
Low Vote 
(using 
regression 
estimates 
from Table 
IV) 
Excess Compensation 56.41% 19.60% 23.18% 
Pay-Performance Sensitivity 0.00% -3.63% 0.00% 
Total Effect of Pay 
(Absolute Terms) 
56.41% 23.23% 23.18% 
Stock Returns 75.28% 14.92% 18.59% 
Return on Assets 69.79% 27.07% 33.17% 
Total Effect of Performance
(Absolute Terms) 
145.07% 41.98% 51.76% 
The results highlight the same trend as Table VI. We find broadly simi-
lar results in terms of the total effect of pay in absolute terms on the say on
pay vote. However, in terms of total effect of performance, the use of
dummy variables shows that performance becomes far more important. In
this case, for a given level of excess compensation and pay-performance
sensitivity, moving from positive performance to negative performance
reduces the fraction of votes against the compensation plan by an average of
41.98% when a dummy variable is used versus 14.99% when continuous
variables are utilized. The largest effect is in the ISS negative vote recom-
mendation. Moving from positive performance to negative performance in-
creases the likelihood of an ISS negative recommendation to 145.07% from
55.48%. These results demonstrate the dramatic effect of negative perform-
ance irrespective of the compensation variables.
In summary, our results highlight that the size and structure of execu-
tive compensation contribute both to the ISS recommendation and to the
level of shareholder support for the executive compensation plan as reflected
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in the outcome of the say on pay result. Our results for the pay variables,
apart from the effect of pay-performance sensitivity on the ISS recommen-
dation, are not surprising. ISS should, we would expect, be more likely to
issue a “no” recommendation if the CEO is receiving a high level of excess
compensation. Similarly, shareholders should be less likely to vote to ap-
prove compensation plans that provide high levels of excess compensation
or in which compensation is insufficiently sensitive to firm performance. To
this extent, the say on pay vote appears to be responding appropriately to
identify problematic compensation practices.
On the other hand, the results of our analysis of the performance vari-
ables are dramatic and potentially troubling. We find that the issuer’s eco-
nomic performance is a substantial driver of both ISS recommendations and
shareholder votes with respect to say on pay, and remains so even when
controlling for pay size and structure. In particular, the fact of negative per-
formance alone significantly increases the likelihood of a say on pay “no”
vote and a negative recommendation. In short, the say on pay vote, which
purports to provide shareholders with a vehicle to express their views on the
issuer’s compensation plan is, at least in part, a referendum on firm perform-
ance. We explore the implications of this finding in Part IV of this Article.
III. IMPLICATIONS
Our findings have two important implications. First, the substantial role
of economic performance in driving both ISS recommendations and share-
holder say on pay votes suggests a limitation on the utility of say on pay as a
tool for addressing the size and structure of executive pay packages. Second,
to the extent that say on pay voting results matter to corporate boards, the
say on pay vote may problematically encourage issuers to focus excessively
on short-term stock price and firm value metrics.
A. The Role of Economic Performance Limits the Effectiveness
of Say on Pay
We show that firm economic performance is a significant factor in both
ISS recommendations and voting outcomes. In particular, firms with strong
stock price performance do not experience significant levels of shareholder
dissent when their CEOs receive substantial excess compensation. At the
same time, shareholders react negatively to unproblematic compensation
packages at issuers that underperform.
To the extent that shareholder voting is largely driven by economic per-
formance, shareholders appear to be limiting their criticism of executive
compensation primarily to firms that are suffering from poor economic per-
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formance.87 At issuers with strong stock price performance, the say on pay
vote is not operating as a useful tool for identifying potential problems with
executive compensation, including structural problems that may create risks
for the sustainability of that performance. Although the rationale for a sepa-
rate say on pay vote is to allow shareholders—those who are otherwise not
critical of a firm’s performance or the board’s judgment—to express their
views on the size and structure of executive compensation in a nuanced way,
the say on pay vote does not appear to be serving that function.
One possibility is that shareholders do not care about the size and struc-
ture of executive pay as long as the company is performing well. Executive
pay at most issuers represents a small fraction of firm revenue, and share-
holders may not view pay levels as economically important. Alternatively,
shareholders may view even excessive levels of pay as well-deserved if the
company has strong economic performance. These possibilities provide rea-
sons why say on pay may be a poor tool for reform if the say on pay objec-
tive is either to reduce high levels of executive compensation or to have
compensation more closely align with performance.88 This is a particularly
important point since the legislative purpose of say on pay was to implement
both of these objectives.89
At the same time, shareholders may be unduly critical of pay packages
at issuers that have experienced poor economic performance, even when
such pay packages do not appear problematic. For example, we found 149
instances of low shareholder votes (less than 80% support) at issuers in
which excess compensation was less than or equal to zero. At these issuers,
it can plausibly be argued that shareholders’ negative votes on pay were
driven primarily by firm performance. Similarly, we find that the level of
shareholder dissent for firms in the lowest quartiles for both economic per-
formance and CEO excess compensation was comparable to that of better
performing firms with higher levels of excess compensation. For at least
some shareholders, the say on pay vote for the worst performers seems to
have been based exclusively on performance rather than pay.
87 See Audrey Bout, Brian Johnson & Steve DeMaria, Does Say on Pay Failure Affect
Future Share Price Performance?, PAY GOVERNANCE (Feb. 1, 2015), http://paygovernance
.com/does-a-say-on-pay-failure-affect-future-share-price-performance/ (reporting that issuers
with failed say on pay votes typically underperform the market prior to the vote).
88 See Jill E. Fisch, The Mess at Morgan, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 651, 678–79 (2015) (arguing
that high levels of shareholder support for executive compensation packages at J.P. Morgan
may have been due to the company’s strong economic performance despite its involvement in a
variety of scandals).
89 See, e.g., Lisa M. Fairfax, Sue on Pay: Say on Pay’s Impact on Directors’ Fiduciary
Duties, 55 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4 (2013) (“The push to mandate say on pay stems from a belief
that it could help curtail inappropriate pay packages and practices, while holding directors
more accountable for their compensation decisions.”); Marisa Anne Pagnattaro & Stephanie
Greene, “Say on Pay”: The Movement to Reform Executive Compensation in the United States
and European Union, 31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 593, 597 (2011) (explaining that say on pay
had its place in Dodd-Frank “because of the widespread perception that executive pay prac-
tices contributed to the financial crisis”).
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Our data offers real world support for the hypothesis tested by Krause,
Whitler, and Semadeni in their laboratory experiments—that shareholder
voting has limited power as a tool for addressing potential agency issues
identified by Bebchuk and Fried.90 To a certain extent, this problem may be
exacerbated by the ISS methodology for defining pay-performance sensitiv-
ity in terms of realized performance, which does not precisely capture the
extent to which pay is structured to align management incentives with share-
holder value. At the same time, focusing on pay structure is of limited value
if, in the absence of poor performance, shareholders do not fully respond to
that issue.
These findings are more problematic if say on pay is designed to reduce
overall compensation levels consistent with broader societal objectives of
equity or wealth distribution.91 To the extent that shareholder voting is driven
primarily by economic performance, shareholder interests are likely to be
imperfectly aligned with the interests of non-shareholder stakeholders. Thus,
if Dodd-Frank was motivated by an effort to protect societal interests from
excessive risk-taking motivated by high-powered compensation incentives
or alternatively excessive or inordinate pay alone, shareholder voting is un-
likely to result in the appropriate compensation reforms.
B. Say on Pay May Exacerbate Problematic Incentives
Our findings also empirically demonstrate the risk that say on pay vot-
ing may exacerbate, rather than eliminate, problems with executive pay
structure. We show that shareholder support for executive pay is highly cor-
related with an issuer’s short-term stock performance. The performance vari-
ables in our analysis focus on the issuer’s economic performance in the year
prior to the say on pay vote. As we have shown, this one-year performance
variable has a dramatic effect on voting outcomes. As a result, the say on
pay vote may have the effect of increasing executives’ incentives to focus on
short-term stock price, instead of working to enhance long-term firm value.
Many commentators have expressed a concern that both issuers and
shareholders have adopted a short-term perspective with respect to strategic
decisions.92 More significantly, they view short-termism as having an ad-
90 See Krause et al., supra note 53, at 98 (citing Lucian A. Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, R
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71, 71–92).
91 See, e.g., THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 20–21 (Arthur
Goldhammer trans., Harvard University Press 2d ed. 2014) (discussing problems associated
with wealth inequality); Fisch, supra note 88, at 653 (discussing say on pay within the concept R
of corporate “publicness”).
92 See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, “Patient Capital”: Can Delaware Corporate Law Help Revive
It?, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1645, 1651 (2011) (identifying short-termism of corporate share-
holders and other forces that are “causing corporate managements to govern for the short-
term”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation
Law, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 772 (2015) (arguing that activist shareholder “pressure
may logically lead to strategies that sacrifice long-term performance for short-term shareholder
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verse effect on business decision-making.93 The rationale for a say on pay
vote is to hold boards accountable, but, to the extent that say on pay holds
boards accountable for short-term firm performance, it heightens these pres-
sures and increases the incentive for boards to sacrifice long-term value in
favor of immediate economic performance.94 Ironically, say on pay may op-
erate in direct contradiction to efforts to reform the structure of executive
pay packages in order to create longer-term incentives.95
A further possibility is that say on pay could contribute not merely to
short-termism, but to excessive risk-taking because of the correlation be-
tween risk and stock market performance. The stock market has traditionally
rewarded issuers for taking risk because diversified shareholders are able to
bear that risk. Incentive-based compensation structures that rely on stock
price, especially short-term stock price, may lead executives to take exces-
sive risk in an effort to maximize short-term stock price.96 The situation may
be worse if the market does not fully understand or reflect the riskiness of an
issuer’s strategic decisions.97
Existing approaches for calculating pay-performance sensitivity may
exacerbate this effect. In firm reporting on pay-performance sensitivity and
in ISS’s evaluation of such sensitivity, the principal performance metric is
total shareholder return (TSR).98 This means that stock price dominates both
wealth.”); but see J.B. Heaton, The ‘Long Term’ in Corporate Law, 72 BUS. LAW. 353, 354
(2017) (disputing the claim that there is a conflict “between short-term wealth maximization
and long-term wealth maximization”).
93 See William H. Donaldson, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Chair-
man: 2005 CFA INSTITUTE ANNUAL CONFERENCE (May 8, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch050805whd.htm (explaining that the “focus on short-term results has, I believe,
had a counter-productive influence on companies, on investors and on analysts themselves”).
94 See Jacobs, supra note 92, at 1651–52 (identifying the risk of incentivizing corporate R
executives to manage to the market).
95 See, e.g., Roberta Romano & Sanjai Bhagat, Reforming Executive Compensation: Fo-
cusing and Committing to the Long-term, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 359 (2009) (proposing pay
package reforms to create long-term incentives).
96 See. e.g., Wm. Gerard Sanders & Donald C. Hambrick, Swinging for the Fences: The
Effects of CEO Stock Options on Company Risk Taking and Performance, 50 ACAD. MGMT. J.
1055, 1076 (2007) (reporting that CEOs take excessive risks to maximize payoffs from stock
option incentive compensation); see also EXXONMOBIL, 2013 EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION
OVERVIEW 8 (2013), www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/Files/news_pub_ir_execcomp2013.pdf
(“[A] formula based approach that relies heavily on one- or three-year total shareholder return
could encourage inappropriate risk taking and have a lasting and negative impact on Exx-
onMobil’s business by encouraging a focus on more immediate results at the expense of our
long-term business model.”).
97 See, e.g., Henry Hu, Risk, Time and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38
UCLA L. REV. 277, 325 (1990) (warning of the excessive risk-taking incentive that incentive-
based compensation can create “when compensation is highly sensitive to perceived perform-
ance, and true, risk-adjusted performance is difficult to measure”).
98 See BJ Firmacion & Jim Kroll, ISS announces pay-for-performance methodology up-
dates for the 2017 proxy season, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON, Nov. 11, 2016, https://www.tower-
swatson.com/en/Insights/Newsletters/Global/executive-pay-matters/2016/ISS-announces-pay-
for-performance-methodology-updates-2017-proxy-season (“Currently, ISS uses TSR as the
sole financial metric in its quantitative pay-for-performance screens.”); see also Mark Van
Clieaf, Stephen O’Byrne & Karel Leeflang, The Alignment Gap Between Creating Value, Per-
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the analysis of pay sensitivity and firm performance.99 Critically, however,
TSR focuses largely on the alignment between stock price and pay rather
than on the creation of long-term economic value. A recent study reports
results consistent with our findings, documenting that shareholders fail to
distinguish, in their say on pay votes, between issuers that create economic
value and issuers that destroy economic value.100 In fact, the study finds that
most issuers do not even disclose meaningful performance metrics that
would allow shareholders to focus on the creation of economic value.101
IV. SAY ON PAY—THE PATH FORWARD
Our findings suggest caution both about say on pay votes and say on
pay itself. In particular, our findings support the conclusion that say on pay
is about more than just pay, it is also about firm stock price performance.
The focus on firm performance may produce excessive risk-taking. Further
analysis is needed to detail whether the say on pay vote is having these
effects.
Some have suggested that say on pay’s primary benefit has been as an
outlet for shareholder dissatisfaction.102 Industry commentators and institu-
tional investors describe an increased dialogue between issuers and institu-
tional investors about pay levels and pay structures.103 But, from a “channel”
perspective, we believe that dissatisfaction with issuers is better expressed
through means that convey actual dissatisfaction. In addition, while we think
the increased dialogue resulting from say on pay is meaningful, it is coinci-
dent with the rise of shareholder power more generally.104 If say on pay were
formance Measurement, and Long-Term Incentive Design, IRRC RESEARCH REPORT 11, 13, 54
(2014) (explaining and criticizing reliance on TSR as a measure of economic performance).
99 See id.
100 See id. at 51–52.
101 See id. at 8, 53. According to Ramy S. Ibrahim, an ISS Corporate Solutions Advisor,
“ISS this year will begin including other financial performance metrics in the initial P4P quan-
titative screen. The metrics have not been finalized yet . . . .” (statement provided by Ramy S.
Ibrahim via email to authors on Nov. 6, 2017).
102 Troutman, Sanders, Say-on-Pay: Wrong Solution, Wrong Problem, (July 9, 2010),
https://www.troutmansanders.com/say-on-pay-wrong-solution-wrong-problem-06-09-2010/
(observing, prior to the adoption of mandatory say on pay, that “the real problem is that
shareholders have no practical ability to voice their disapproval regarding company perform-
ance–other than voting with their feet–and say-on-pay proposals have evolved as a proxy for a
more fundamental complaint on company performance”).
103 See, e.g., Seymour Burchman & Blair Jones, Righting the Say On Pay Ship After a
“No” Vote, SEMLER BROSSY (Sept. 2013), http://www.semlerbrossy.com/wp-content/uploads/
ATD-Shareholder-Engagement.pdf (“One of the positive outcomes of the Say on Pay provi-
sion in the Dodd-Frank legislation has been more regular dialogue between companies and
shareholders.”).
104 See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency
Capitalism: Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
862, 897 (2013) (explaining ability of activist shareholders to leverage their power through the
support of more passive institutional investors).
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to be eliminated as a legal requirement, we believe this dialogue would
continue.
Our results also suggest that it would be productive for ISS to examine
the metrics of its say on pay recommendations. While ISS recommendations
are not dispositive, they substantially influence institutional shareholder
votes.105 ISS’s use of realized pay for performance may exacerbate the con-
cerns raised in this Article by incorporating an ex post measurement linked
to stock performance. The ISS approach also appears to differ from the man-
ner in which shareholders evaluate pay-performance sensitivity.
CONCLUSION
Say on pay is in its early years, and issuers and shareholders are still
developing their approach to the vote on executive compensation. This Arti-
cle provides an analysis of the first five years of shareholder voting in an
effort to determine the key factors that influence the say on pay vote and, in
particular, the relative role of compensation factors and firm performance.
Our results confirm that both compensation and economic performance
are key drivers of both ISS recommendations and voting results. Critically,
however, we find that economic performance is an important factor even
after controlling for excess compensation. In other words, we find that say
on pay is not just about pay. For under-performing firms, say on pay appears
to be a useful tool for disciplining management. However, when firms per-
form well, shareholders do not seem to care about excess pay. We argue that
these findings limit the potential value of the say on pay vote. In addition,
the close connection between voting results, stock price, and firm perform-
ance raises the risk that the say on pay vote may increase short-termism.
When say on pay is not about pay, even an advisory vote can cause real
economic harm.
105 See, e.g., Choi, Fisch & Kahan, supra note 84 (finding that, in uncontested director R
elections, proxy advisor recommendations drive 6-10% of the vote).
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